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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Inter Vivos Trusts of Personalty-Effect of Stipulation by the Settlor that the Law of His Domicile Shall Apply When All the
Operative Facts Occurred in Another State-Settlor, in New York, executed
a deed of trust of personalty. The deed named a New York company as trustee,
and provided that the trust should be administered there, and the res was delivered
to the trustee in New York. Settlor, a domiciliary of New Jersey, stipulated the
trust should be governed by New Jersey law. The provisions of the trust deed
violated the New York rule of accumulation, but were valid under New Jersey
law. Plaintiff ' brought an action to recover the accumulations. Held, that the
accumulations were valid, since the trust was governed by New Jersey law.
Shannon v.Irving Trust Co., 285 N. Y. Supp. 478 (App. Div. Ist Dep't, 1936).
New York courts have gone further than the courts of any other jurisdiction
in an effort to sustain trusts, 2 and to do so here, created a conflict of laws problem

where none had really existed, and then incorrectly allowed the settlor's cqwn
choice of law to govern. 3 It cannot be seriously contended that a settlor may
choose the law of any state he desires to govern an inter vivos trust, for the law
which applies is the law of the jurisdiction in which all the operative factors
occurred,4 and it should be immaterial that the settlor selected his domicile. Although the settlor's domicile is, of itself, necessarily an important factor in the
case of a testamentary trust,5 courts have recently begun to recognize that the
domicile of the settlor should bear little weight in the case of an inter vivos trust.,
It is admitted that decisions can be found, especially in New York, which declare
that an inter vivos trust is governed by the law of the settlor's domicile, but in all
of these cases there was some other material factor lending considerable support
to the decision. In some, the trust res was located at the domicile, 7 in others the
trust was created s or administered ' there. Other courts failed to distinguish
between inter vivos and testamentary trusts. 10 Clearly, the factors which should
i. Plaintiff was a life beneficiary of part of the income; principal and accumulations
were to pass upon his death to a named beneficiary.
2. Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws (i93o) 44 HAv.L. REV. 161.
3. Oddly enough the personal property laws of New York support the decision inferentially. N. Y. PEns. Poi'. LA. (CAHmL, 1935 Supp.) § 12 (a) states that when the rer is
situated in New York and the settlor "declares in the instrument creating such trust that it
shall be construed and regulated by the laws of this state, the validity and effect of such trust
shall be determined by such laws." The court infers from this that the settlor may negative
New York law by designating some other law. But it seems doubtful that the legislature
meant to create a proper conflict rule and at the same time meant to grant the settlor the
privilege of evading it.
4. See Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. lO3, 112 (859); Beale, What Law Governs the
Validity of a Contract (I91o) :23
H v.L. REV. 26o.
5.Whitney v. Dodge, io5 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (1894) ; Cross v. United States Trust
Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 3o N. E. 125 (1892); REsTATEmENT, Convucrs (1934) §§ 295, 298.
6. See Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 391, 187 N. E. 65, 69 (I933).

7. Maynard v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 2o8 App. Div. 112, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 83

(Ist Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 238 N. Y. 592, 144 N. E. 905 (1924).

8. Sullivan v. Babcock, 63 How. Prac. 120 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1882). The strongest case
in support of the instant decision is Townsend v. Allen, 59 Hun 622, 13 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Sup.
Ct. 1891). There the court clearly decided that law of the domicile of the settlor governed
an inter vivos trust, but the facts do not show where the deed was executed.
9.For an analysis of these cases and for a collection of authorities see Hutchison v.
Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933). This is the latest decision of the Court of Appeals
on a relevant issue, and while the case was not decided on this precise point, the language of
the case is opposed to the present decision. See also Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Con-

flict of Laws (193o) 44 HA v.L. REv. 161, 175 et seq.
io. Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 339, 3o N. E. 125, 127 (1892),

govern the determination of law as to inter vivos trusts are the situs of the res,"
ii. RESTATEmExT, Coqriicrs (1934) § 294 (1).
(9O)
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the locus of administration,1 2 and the place of execution of the trust deed.13 In
the instant case all of these factors supported an application of New York law.
While the efforts of New York courts to sustain inter vivos trusts is generally
to be commended, it is doubtful if the court should have been so zealous as to
adopt an obviously improper rule of law.
Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-State Tax on Intrastate Portion of Business as Burden on Interstate Commerce-An action was brought
by the state of Washington to recover a tax of one and one-half per cent of
defendant railroad's gross income, imposed for the privilege of engaging in business "within this state." 1 Defendant, whose business was both interstate and
intrastate, was required by law as well as by considerations of practicability to
maintain its intrastate service; this portion of its business was being operated at
a loss which had to be borne by the receipts on its interstate business. As a
result the tax, even though ostensibly imposed on the intrastate part alone, would
necessarily be paid from interstate income. Held, that the tax was not such a
direct burden on the interstate business as to violate the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution, 2 because, even though it "lessens the benefit derived by
interstate commerce", yet the tax here in question would not "induce the company
to withdraw from the local business, even if it were permitted by law to do so". 3
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State of Washington; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
State of Washington, U. S. L. Week, March 3, 1936, at 35 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1936).
In thus affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, the
Court did not deign to support its decision on the tenuous ground criticized in a
previous issue of this REvIEw 4 (that the tax did not burden interstate commerce
because the defendant had failed to exhaust the remedy given by law allowing
application to the public service authorities to increase its intrastate rates). It
preferred, rather, to adopt a line of reasoning which, in effect, can be nothing less
than a repudiation of the Supreme Court's long-standing pronouncement that
where a company cannot withdraw from its intrastate business without also discontinuing its interstate business, the state's power to tax the privilege of doing
business within its borders no longer prevails.5 For, if a corporation whose books
show an undeniable loss on its interstate business is still subject to the state's
occupation tax on the ground that the corporation would probably not give up
that portion of its business even if it could, it is somewhat difficult to conceive of
a situation in which the aforesaid rule would be of any force whatsoever.
Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Constitutionality of a State
Statute Authorizing Condemnation for Slum Clearance Housing ProjectsA public corporation organized under a statute authorizing the city to set up an
authority with power to investigate living and housing conditions in the city, and
to develop projects for clearing, replanning and reconstruction of slum areas, and
to provide housing accommodations for persons of low income,1 sought to condemn certain premises owned by the defendant, who contended that the statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and a similar
provision in the state constitution. Held (one judge dissenting), for the plaintiff,
12.

Id. §§ 297, 299.

13. Id. §294

(2).

i.Wash. Laws 1933, c. 191, § 2.
U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. Instant case at 43.
4. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 425.
2.

277

S. See Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 42o, 421 (9o2) ; Sprout v. City of South Bend,
U. S. 163, 171 (1928) ; (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 425, 426.
L N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 4, §§ 60-78.
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because the object of the statute was to benefit the public and, as the condemnation here involved was for a public use, there was no violation of either the state
or federal Constitution. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, N. Y. Ct.

of App., March 18, 1936.
Although clearance of slum areas undoubtedly is beneficial to the public
aesthetically, 2 economically, 3 and socially,4 some courts have held, despite such
manifest advantages, that federal statutes to this effect are unconstitutional.5 But
whether or not the federal government has the power of eminent domain, 6 it is
clear that this power is an attribute of the state governments under their general
police power, provided its exercise is restricted to projects involving a public use.7
The chief difficulty arises in determining just what a public use is. Some states
hold that it exists only if the enterprise is one operated by a governmental agency
as, for example, publicly owned post offices, parks and memorials. s Others hold
any use public in nature if a benefit to the public results from the operation.9
The instant court, accepting the latter definition, found the use public and therefore one permitting the exercise of eminent domain under the police power of the
state, despite the fact that only a relatively limited number of persons could reside
in the apartments, which, moreover, under the terms of the statute, could be
owned by private individuals. Of course, there is a considerable conflict of
opinion as to the advisability of government housing projects and other social
legislation, but such a question is primarily one of policy, and this court is to be
commended for refusing, unlike many courts,'0 to invade the province of the
legislature.
2. Beautification o~f the city by parks and scenic roads has been held a proper ground for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262
U. S. 7o (1923) ; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893) ; Malloy v. Galveston
County, 42 S. W. (2d) 163 (Civ. App. Tex. 1931). In a like manner, clearance of unsightly
slum areas, which would result in beautifying the city, should furnish a valid basis for eminent domain proceedings.
3. The state may exercise its inherent police power for the public benefit in cases of
economic emergency. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921) ; Brown Holding Co., Inc. v.
Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921) ; People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (0933),
aff'd sub norn. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (934) ; Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 290 U. S. 398 (1934). One purpose of the instant statute was to increase employment
in the building trades during the depression.
4. It has been recognized that slum areas are breeding places of disease, crime, juvenile
delinquency and other social ills. See United States v. Certain Lands' in City of Louisville,
78 F. (2d) 684, 688 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
5. United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th,
1935) (one justice dissenting). A state statute which attempted to authorize slum clearance
by the federal government was held invalid in United States v. Certain Lands in the City of
Detroit, 12 Fed. Supp. 345 (E. D. Mich. 1935).
6. Although the argument in the cases cited in note 5, supra, was that the reason the
government could not condemn lands was that the use was not public, the courts recognized
that such a power existed in the states. But the federal government clearly has the power
of eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment; and in conjunction with the power to provide for the general welfare, the United States ought to be able to acquire property by eminent domain as readily as the states can under their police power. Chappell v. United States,
I6o U. S. 499 (1896) ; United States v. Jotham Bixby Co., 55 F. (2d) 317 (S. D. Cal. 1932) ;
Patten & Co. v. United States, 61 F. (2d) 97o (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) ; United States v. Threlkeld, 72 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 62o (1934). See Corwin,
ConstitutionalAspects of Federal Housing (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 131.
7. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 20o U. S. 527 (19o6) ; Green v. Frazier,
253 U. S. 233 (1920).
8. Arnsperger v. Crawford, ioi Md. 247, 61 Atl. 413 (1905) ; Farmers' Market Co. v.
Phila. & Reading Terminal Co., 1o Pa. Co. 25 (1891). Cf. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 At. 9o4 (1913).
9. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (I9o5); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,
200 U. S. 527 (19o6) ; Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700 (923).
Io. Courts often have invalidated housing legislation lest it encourage the government
"to go too far" in supplanting private enterprise in general. See, for example, United States
v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 78 F. (2d) 684, 687, 688 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
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Constitutional Law-Unreasonable Searches and Seizures-Injunction
Against Production of Telegrams in Response to Blanket Subpoena Issued
by Senate Lobby Investigating Committee-Plaintiff attorneys employed
defendant telegraph company to communicate with clients and other persons
during a period of ten months. The Senate Lobby Investigating !Committee
served the defendant with a blanket subpcena calling for production of the copies
of all such communications, whereupon plaintiffs sought to have defendant
enjoined from compliance. Held, that the defendant telegraph company should
be enjoined from obeying the subpoena, since it amounted to an "unreasonable
search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Straw~in v.
Western Union Telegraph Company, Sup. Ct. Dist. Col., March II, 1936.1
Both the factual setting and the legal problem make this latest incident in the
old dispute between the desiderata of effective government action and of freedom
of personal action one of peculiar significance. 2 The Fourth Amendment, originally passed as a part of a definite attempt to guarantee the latter at the expense
of the former,3 often has been declared to be limited to situations in which a
criminal offense has been charged against the party seeking its protection.4 But,
in spite of numerous supporting assertions in the cases, this conclusion does
not seem to be based on unquestionable authority.5 Indeed, it is possible to find
i. The text of Justice Wheat's oral opinion may be found in N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1936, at I.
2. See Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1928) 22 Am. POL. ScI. REv.
275. Cf. Munro, The Penduelum of Politics (1927) 154 HARPERs
718.
3. This is reasonably clear as one of the motives which led Madison to espouse the first
ten amendments. See 3 RlvEs, LIFE AND TIMES OF MAnIsON (1868) 38-4o. This conclusion
is amply supported by the debates in Congress prior to the submission of the amendments. i
ANN. CONG. 73o et seq. (Gales ed., 1834).
4. In re Meador, Fed. Cas. No. 9,375 (N. D. Ga. 1869) ; In re Strouse, Fed. Cas. No.
13,548 (D. Nev. 1871). The conclusion voiced in these cases is adopted in (1936), 84 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 789.
5. It is important to point out here that the notion that the Fourth Amendment is restricted to cases where a crime has been charged is voiced almost exclusively in lower court
cases dealing with the federal tax power. For instance, in United States v. Three Tons of
Coal, Fed. Cas. No. 16,515 (E. D. Wis. 1875) the question was the constitutionality of a tax
statute enabling the government attorney to obtain a subpcena in actions other than criminal
in nature "whenever, in his belief, any business book, invoice, or paper, belonging to or under
the control of the defendant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation" and after making
"a written motion particularly describing such book, invoice, or paper, and setting forth the
allegation which he expects to prove" (Italics added). Such a statute, it seems clear, is
hardly permissive of an "unreasonable search", but the court, in. order to sustain its constitutionality more easily, declared that the Fourth Amendment applied only in "criminal"
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the debates in Congress prior to the
submission of the first ten amendments and found an express statement that the Fifth
Amendment should be so limited. i ANN. CONG. 782 (Gales ed., 1834). From this the court
deduced that the Fourth Amendment was likewise restricted in scope. It is hard to see the
logic of this conclusion. In the case of In re Meador, Fed. Cas. No. 9,375 (N. D. Ga. I869),
also a tax case, the same position was reached by an entirely different line of reasoning. It
was pointed out that the adoption of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was primarily occasioned by the fear of the "search warrant" as known in England and in America in preRevolutionary days. It had been observed in Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray 454, 456
(Mass. 1859), that "Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as processes
which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil proceedings". From this the
court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment could have no application to warrants in socalled civil cases. The opposite conclusion would seem more accurate, for the mere absence
of an abuse at the time of the passage of the Amendment does not preclude the interpretation
that such abuse, should it arise, should fall within the ambit of the Amendment. Especially
would this be true in the light of the declaration in Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298,
304 (I92I), that the Fourth amendment should "receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by
the imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers."
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numerous persuasive dicta to the opposite effect.' Moreover, it seems difficult
not only to define what is a criminal action,7 but also to draw any proper distinction between cases in which a party has actually been charged with a crime
and situations in which the evidence uncovered may lead to his being so charged."
However, it may be that the instant case, coupled with the recent decision in
Zimmerman v. Wilson,9 represents the inception of a tendency to apply the language of the Fourth Amendment liberally.' 0 But, even dismissing, as inefficacious, the possible constitutional safeguard of the plaintiffs, it may be possible
to justify the result on purely equitable grounds."" Since many of the telegrams
involved were confidential communications between attorney and client, and in
addition would probably be largely irrelevant to the activities of the Committee,2
equitable protection of the right of privacy might have been entirely proper.'
On the other hand, it may be urged that the adversely affected interest of the
plaintiffs is small indeed in comparison with the imperative necessity of probing
to the bottom the modern democratic excrescence-government by pressure
groups.13 Because of this consideration, the court might have refused to enjoin
the use of a dragnet subpcena on the ground of inability to interfere with the
legislative process. 14
6. E. g.: "This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the
duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws". Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.383, 392 (1914) ;
"this protection is so broad and ample that it embraces all persons, even those accused of
crime .

.

.

."

It re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed. 605, 6o6 (W. D. Pa. 1918) (Italics

added). In the recent case of Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, U. S. L. WEEK,
April 7, 1936, at 17 (U. S. Sup. Ct.), broad language may be found. The majority opinion
declares: "An investigation not based upon specified grounds is quite as objectionable as a
search warrant not based upon specific statement of facts." Id. at 21.
7. See Morris R. Cohen, On Absolutisnms in Legal Thought (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv.
681, 686.
8. Even if the actual facts uncovered on a "fishing expedition" were within the bar o~f
the Amendment, as narrowly construed, in a subsequent criminal action, a sufficient number
of "leads" might be uncovered to enable the authorities to gather other evidence without
technical violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
9.C. C. A. 3d, Feb. II, 1936; 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 789.
io. There were indications before the recent wave of opposition against strong governmental action that the Supreme Court would narrowly construe the Fourth Amendment. Olinstead v. United States, 277 U. S.438 (1928), 77 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 139 (evidence obtained
by tapping of telephone wires held admissible in criminal action). An interesting discussion
of the authorities may be found in Note (1928) 8 BosT. U. L. Ray. 294.
ii. Such a rationale would not be without support. See 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 789. A socalled right of privacy in letters has been recognized. See Warren and Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy (89o) 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 2Ol. There seems to be little ground for differentiating telegrams from letters.
12. Such an argument could be grounded on the privileged nature of many of the communications, since they were between attorney and client. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Attorney and Client (1928) i6 CAL. L. REV. 487, 4g3.
13. "An organized group in urging a congressman to consider its interest before the interest of the 'people' and threatening its non-support and hostility for non-compliance, acts
as a deterrent on the Congressman's freedom of thought and action and makes him a mere
spokesman of its interests. The organizations that take as their sole criterion the attitude
of a public man toward their particular programs, are undermining the very roots of democratic government. To the extent which they force attention to their own selfish interests,
to the neglect of the national welfare of the country, they are highly subversive." HEIMNG,
GRoTP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS (1929) 242. For an interesting account of the
lobbying activities of the Anti-Saloon League, see ODEGARD, PRESSURE POLITICS (1928)
passhn.
14. Such a result would be difficult to support, however, in the light of the statement in
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927), that "neither house [of Congress] is invested
with a 'general' power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures. . . ." But see
the recent opinion of Justice Wheat in the Hearst suit against both the Senate Committee
and the Federal Communications Commission, reported in N. Y. TImES, April 9, 1936, at I8.
He there said: "I have not been informed of any case in which any court has assumed to
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Crimes-Lotteries-Consideration Necessary to Constitute a LotteryDefendant, indicted for violation of statute prohibiting the establishment or
advertisement of a lottery,' had operated a "bank night" scheme in conjunction
with his theatre. The rules provided for the distribution of chances in the
theatre and several appointed places elsewhere, and a selection of the winner
at the theatre on a stipulated night. The chances could be obtained without
payment, and announcement of the winner was conveyed to the outside of the
theatre, so that anyone who did not wish to pay admission could, if he was the
winner, enter and receive the prize. Held, not guilty, because the chances for
the prize were obtainable without payment of admission to the theatre, so that
the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery was lacking. State
v. Hundling, 264 N. W. 6o8 (Iowa, 1936) ; State v. Eames, 183 Atl. 590 (N. H.
1936).
At common law, lotteries were illegal only when they became a public
3
nuisance,2 but by statute in almost all the states they are now illegal per se.
Very few states, however, attempt to define the lottery which they pronounce
illegal. Instead, in most jurisdictions the meaning of "lottery" is determined by
4
the public usage of the term, and three essentials are generally necessary; consideration, a prize, and the distribution of the prize by chance rather than on
the basis of merit. 5 The consideration necessary to constitute a lottery is usually
something of pecuniary value which must be given for the chance to win a
prize.6 Such pecuniary consideration may be given for the chance alone, or
primarily for the chance, although in connection with a purchase of goods or
services, or primarily for the latter things, with the chance being only incidentally acquired.7 But it is to be sharply distinguished from the non-pecuniary con8
sideration consisting of acts undertaken by the promisee to his detriment. Also,
dictate to a committee of the Senate what it should do and what it should not do, and I do
not feel that I have any right to inaugurate any such principle as that." Accordingly, he
refused to enjoin the use of telegrams already subpcenaed from the Western Union Company. It is hard to reconcile this language with that used in the instant case, except upon
the wide divergence between the two fact situations. In referring to the instant case, Justice
Wheat declared: "Suit was brought by those having a vital interest in these telegrams, and
I granted an injunction on those grounds, that it was an invalid subpena. The question of
privilege came in only incidentally, but it simply illustrated the danger of such subpoena
because by their terms they would include all kinds of privileged communications."
§ 13218.
I.Iowa Code (93)
2.2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 1777.
3. See Picket, Contests and the Lottery Laws (1932) 45 HARV. L.REV. 1196, n. I,for a
compilation of statutes.
4. State v. Lipkin, 169 N. C. 265, 84 S.E. 34o (19i5).
5. Homer v. United States, 147 U. S.449 (1893) ; Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies,
181 Fed. 579 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. i9io) ; States v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 Pac. 37 (I926) ;
§ 319; N. Y. PENAL LAW (1916) § 1370. In Florida, a fourth
CAL. PENAL CODE (93)
element is added-the requirement that the device be such as will "contaminate" the whole
community. Hardison v. Coleman, 164 So. 520 (Fla. 1935) (slot machines held not to partake
of the nature of a lottery as they did not operate extensively enough to "contaminate" the
whole community).
6. Post Publishing Co. v. Murray, 230 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. Ist, 1916) ; Yellow-Stone Kit
v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1889); Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893);
Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 128 Neb. 13, 257 N. W. 493 (934) ; State
v. Lipkin, 169 N. C. 265, 84 S.E. 340 (1915) ; Society Theatre v. City of Seattle, II8 Wash.
258, 203 Pac. 21 (1922).
7. Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1889) ; State v. Wokan Amusement
Co., 162 Okla. 16o, 39 P. (2d) 967 (1933) ; Society Theatre v. City of Seattle, 118 Wash.
258, 203 Pac. 21 (3922).
8. See Notes (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 465; (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 744, criticising
Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 242 (1931), which held that a pecuniary consideration was not necessary in order that the scheme be pronounced a lottery. The court in the
Hundling case relied upon these notes in rejecting Maughs v. Porter.
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the consideration required refers to the detriment incurred by the holder of the
chance,9 rather than to any benefit which the distributor of the prize may receive.-"
Thus, the distributor may benefit by an increased business due to the advertising
effect of a scheme involving the drawing of chances for a prize, and yet if the
chance holder need not purchase anything from the distributor as a condition
to the acquisition of a chance, he has given no consideration. It is under this
latter principle that the lottery laws are dexterously evaded, as in the instant
cases. The distributor will give the opportunity to acquire a free chance only
under such circumstances that it is unlikely anyone will take advantage of it.
Thus, the distributor may give free chances at his theatre only to those sufficiently bold to appear in the lobby and request one without first purchasing an
admission, and he will then contend that the scheme was not a lottery because the
chances were free." Because the privilege to acquire a free chance would be
exercised in no material degree, and as a practical matter the large mass of chance
holders would have paid a consideration,
a realistic attitude should compel the
2
courts to hold the scheme a lottery.1
Martial Law-Power of Governor to Use Militia to Oust State Officials
-Upon refusal of South Carolina highway commissioners, holding unexpired
terms, to vacate their offices, the Governor proclaimed a state of insurrection.
Under the proclamation, militia, armed with machine guns, turned the plaintiffs
out of office and installed the Governor's appointees.' On petition to restrain
their successors from acting as commissioners, held, granted, as the Governor
had exceeded his constitutional authority by acts that, in effect, amounted to a
declaration of martial law.

Hearon v. Calus, 183 S. E. 13 (S. C. 1935).

It is generally recognized that an executive declaration that a state of insurrection exists, may not be reviewed by the courts. 2 But as to whether the executive may then proclaim martial law, in the absence of a state of war, there is
no such unanimity of opinion. Three divergent approaches, however, are discernible: (i) "Martial law" can not exist in either the United States or Great
Britain in time of peace. Troops may be called out to aid the civil authorities,
but the former have no greater rights or immunities than the latter.3 (2) The
9. People v. Cardas, 28 P. (2d) 99 (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1933) ; Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 128 Neb. 13, 257 N. W. 493 (1934) ; State v. Wokan Amusement Co., 162 Okla. 16o, ig P. (2d) 967 (1933).
io. People v. Mail & Express Co., 179 N. Y. S. (Ct. Spec. Sess. City of N. Y. 1919),
where the newspaper, as the distributor of the prizes through announcement of winners in its
daily issues, provided free copies at announced locations for those not wishing to purchase
the paper. For this reason it was held to be no lottery, there being no consideration required
for the chances. Contra: Willis v. Young & Stembridge [i9o7] i K. B. 448 (held, under a
similar state of facts, that the benefit received by the newspaper through a 2o per cent increase in circulation was sufficient consideration for a lottery.
I1. See the argument to this effect in the dissenting opinion in State v. Danz, 140 Wash.
546, 551, 250 Pac. 37, 39 (1926).
12. Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz, ii F. Supp. 566 (S. D. Iowa, 1935) ; State v.
Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 Pac. 37 (x926). The court in the former case held that where the
"free offer" was given under circumstances which made it doubtful whether many persons
would take advantage of it, the question of whether a consideration was paid by the chance
holder was one of fact for the jury, dependent on all the circumstances of the particular case.
i. For subsequent litigation growing out of this incident, see Heyward v. Long, 183 S. E.
145 (S. C. 1935); Ex parte Williamson, 183 S. E. 505 (S. C. 1936).
2. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I (U. S. 1849) ; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909);
Chapin v. Ferry, 3 Wash. 386, 28 Pac. 754 (189i). See generally, Note (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 879.
3. Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484 (i91); Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray 121
(Mass. 1855) ; Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924) ; In re Kemp,
16 Wis. 359 (1863) ; see Ballantine, Military Dictatorship in California and West Virginia
(1913) I CALIF. L. REv. 413.
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executive may always summon the military forces, and the locality becomes a
military district, entirely subject to the will of the commander, even though the
occasion is only a domestic disturbance not amounting to rebellion. 4 (3) Between these two extremes is the modern doctrine of "qualified martial law",
which recognizes a military power independent of civil authority, but does not
permit constitutional rights to be suspended by military fiat. 5 The first view
prevailed in this country 6 and in England 7 until the beginning of the present
century. But with the growth of industrial conflict since the ]Pullman Strike
of i89o, s the other and more drastic types of "martial law", also, have been
invoked, and with particularly alarming frequency in the past three years., The
period between i9oo and 1922 was marked by the prevalence of the second 10 or
"extreme military" view." In many cases the total disregard of constitutional
rights, 12 is paralleled only by the war time measures upheld by the English courts
during the Boer War '- and in Ireland.' 4 The instant case represents a line of
4. United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 2o8 (D. Neb. 1922) ; In re Moyer,
35 Colo. i59, 85 Pac. 190 (1905) ; McKittrick v. Brown, 85 S. W. (2d) 385 (Mo. 1935), 84
U. OF PA. L. REv. 259; State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912),
45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 996 (913) ; see White, Martial Law (0935) 14 ORE. L. REv. 402.
5. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143
Pac. 747 (1914) ; Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. App. 392, 137 S. W. 1137 (191) ; see Fairman, Martial Ride and the Suppression of Insurrection (1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 766, 786;
Note (1935) 13 Nm. L. BULL. 292, 296.
6. Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection (1929) 23 ILL. L. REV.
766; Roberts, Some Observations on the Case of Private Wadsworth (1903) 42 A.s. L. REG.
(u. s.) 63, 89; see Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. x866) ; cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How.
I (U. S. 1849). This view is still enforced by some courts. See supra note 3.
7. Wolf Tone's Case, 27 St. Tr. 613 (1798) ; see FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE
(i930) 1o6-io9. The same principle, however, was not followed with reference to all parts
of the Empire, as is illustrated by the vigorous methods employed in putting down the riots
in Barbados (186), Demerara (1823), Ceylon (1848) and Jamaica (1831 and 1865), coupled
with acts of indemnity to protect those restoring peace and order, id. at 52-58; see Flood,
Martial Law and Its Effect Upon the Soldier's Liability to the Civilian (1925) 73 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 380.

8. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (895)

; WITr, THE GOVERNMENT IN LAROR Disrpums
83; FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INjucTiON (i930) 17-24.
9. "In 1935, up till November 1st, troops were used 22 times in 15 states. In 1934, 21
times in i8 states, and in 1933, 14 times in ii states." (1936) 36 CoL L. REV. 494, 496 n. 17;
(1932)

Legis. (1935) 35 Coi- L. REv. 917, 924, n. 47.
io. United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 28o Fed. 208 (D. Neb. 1922) ; In re Boyle,
6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899) ; In re Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913) ; Ex
parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 1O8 S. E. 428 (1921) ; FAIRmAN, THE LAW OF MARrIAL
RULE (193o) 67-89.
ii. Ballantine, Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal (1915)

14 MICH. L. REv.

102, 103.

12. United States ex rel. McMaster v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S. D. Tex. 1920) (upheld
a conviction and imprisonment by a Provost Martial, for "speeding") ; Commonwealth ex
rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 216 Pa. i65, 55 AtI. 952 (1903) (militiaman who killed a person
upon his failure to halt when ordered, released on habeas corpus) ; Hatfield v. Graham, 73
W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914) (sustained action of Governor in causing printing plant,
outside of disaffected county, to be destroyed) ; 24 Ops. Att'y Gen. 570 (1903) stated that
an army officer, who had tortured a priest to death in the Philippines, could not be prosecuted
as he had resigned from the service. See Ballantine, supra note 3, for a description of the lawless conduct of federal troops in San Francisco, following the earthquake; also American
Civil Liberties Union's pamphlet, Land of the Free (935)
17.
13. In Mgomini v. Governor and Att'y Gen., 22 T. L. R. 413 (1906), twelve native rebels
were executed in Natal, by order of a military court, when a state of war did not exist.
This was sustained by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Ex part Marais [I9O2]
A. C. io9 upheld a refusal to release a prisoner of the military forces, taken in an area far
removed from the theatre of war. A similar decision was reached in Queen v. Bekker, 17
Sup. Ct. Rep. (Cape of Good Hope) 340 (1900).
14. The King v. Adjutant Gen. [i923] I Ir. R. 5; The King v. O'Sullivan [1923] 2 Ir.
R. i3; The King v. Strickland [1921] 2 Ir. R. 333. All of these cases applied the rule of
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recent decisions, tending toward the intermediate or "qualified martial law"
approach."
The weakness of this view is that it upholds any action "reasonably related" to the restoration of order,1 6 for, although the employment of troops
to test the power to hold office was obviously unnecessary when the courts were
open, in less clear cut cases, almost any act committed in quelling a disturbance
can be brought within its ample bounds. This is illustrated by a recent federal
case which upheld the privilege of militiamen to arrest the petitioner at his home
and to search it, solely because he was a participant in a general strike. 7 The
most practical solution would seem to be that of Professor Ballantine,' s who
would specifically define the limits of lawful action by statute.
Mortgages-Assumption by Grantee of Mortgaged Property-Liability
of Grantee to Mortgagee and to Grantor-Mortgagor in Pennsylvania-Real
estate, subject to a mortgage securing a bond issue, had been conveyed to the
defendant who had expressly assumed and agreed to pay. When the bonds
matured and the grantee failed to pay, a bondholder, as legal plaintiff, brought
this suit against it. Held, that the grantee was liable in an action brought in
the name of the grantor-mortgagor to the use of the mortgagee, and although
the action was improperly titled, the record was regarded as amended to the
proper form. Frey v. United Traction Co., 320 Pa. 196, 181 Atl. 775 (1935).
In order to prevent a mortgage from collecting a deficiency judgment against
them, the grantors-mortgagors brought suit to the use of the mortgagee against
the grantees who had expressly assumed the mortgage. Held, that the grantees'
obligation was to indemnify against liability and so they were liable in the action
by the mortgagors to use of the mortgagee. Ruzyc to use of Bambaugh z.
Brozcut, 320 Pa. 213, 18I Atl. 783 (1935).
Mortgagee, having entered judgment against mortgagor on her bond, petitioned for a deficiency judgment. The mortgagor then filed two petitions
seeking to have the court open the judgment and to allow her to enter a
defense. One alleged a merger of the estates; the other alleged a conveyance
by the mortgagor's grantee to a trustee for the mortgagee, and an assumption of the mortgage by the trustee. From a denial based upon the former
petition, the mortgagor appealed. Held, that the appeal should be dismissed
without prejudice, but that the second petition presented another problem,
the facts of which must be decided by the court below, and the charge based
upon the following rule: where there is a conveyance under and subject to
the mortgage, the grantee is liable merely to indemnify his grantor against loss,
but that where the grantee expressly assumes and agrees to pay, he becomes
directly liable to the mortgagee on default or maturity. Fair Oaks Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Kahler, 320 Pa. 245, 181 Atl. 779 (1935).
Ex parte Marais, supra note 13 and denied habeas corpas to military prisoners. The rule
also was applied to a military death sentence, .for the offence of carrying a pistol. The King
v. Allen (192I) 2 Ir. R. 241; cf. Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, io8 S. E. 428 (1921).
15. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932) ; Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F.
Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934) ; United States ex rel. Palmer v. Adams, 26 F. (2d) 141 (D. Colo.
1927), dismissed as moot in 29 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. 8th, 1928) ; cf. Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser,
,83 Fed. 415 (D. N. D. igig), dismissed as moot in 267 Fed. 13o (;C. C. A. 8th, i92o).
I6. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 85 (19o9) ; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S.
378, 400 (1932) ; Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 36o (S.D. Ind. 1935).
17. Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ind. 1935) noted in (1936) 36 COL. L. Rv.

494.
102.

18. Ballantine, Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal (1915) 14 MicH. L. REV.

I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 12, §§ 655, 656. "A grantee of real estate which
is . . . bound by mortgage . . . shall not be personally liable for the payment of such

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Prior to the Act of 1878 1 a grantee of real estate who had expressly
the grantor himself had not been liable to the mortgagee; and a grantee who
had not so assumed or who had taken only under and subject to the mortgage was
probably under a duty only to indemnify his grantor against loss. 2 The provisions of the statute seemed clearly intended to change this law, but judicial
interpretation has altered the act beyond recognition. By 1894, the supreme
court had decided that the statute was intended to protect the grantee from suit
by the mortgagee, but not by his grantor.3 Thus, where the conveyance was
under and subject to the mortgage with no express assumption, the statute has
been construed as preventing suit against the grantee by the mortgagee, unless
the latter has been assigned the grantor's right of action,4 but as not preventing
'the grantor from indemnifying himself against loss by suing the grantee. 5
Having thus practically decided that the statute represented a mere codification
of the preexisting law in this aspect, the court proceeded to destroy the effect of
the act still further by allowing the mortgagee to sue as use plaintiff when the
grantee had expressly assumed the mortgage. 6 The only force given to the
statute in this situation, therefore, was to prevent the mortgagee from suing
as legal plaintiff. Although the instant cases continue to recognize this as the
technically correct procedure, it can hardly be regarded now as a limitation upon
the mortgagee's rights as they existed prior to the act, when the supreme court
will regard the record as amended in that court. The act may still be effective,
however, in freeing the expressly assuming grantee from liability to the mortgagee after the grantee himself has conveyed the land, in cases in which he
had not expressly assumed continuing liability. 7 There have also been several
decisions during the past twenty-five years where the court apparently made the
"mistake" of interpreting the statute literally, by refusing to allow the mortgagee
to sue the grantee where there was an express assumption.8 A considerable body
*. mortgage . . . unless he shall, by an agreement in writing, have expressly assumed
a personal liability therefor, or there shall be express words in the deed of conveyance stating that the grant is made on condition of the grantee assuming such personal liability: Provided, That the use of the words 'under and subject to the payment of such . . . mortgage . . .' shall not alone be so construed as to make such grantee personally liable as
af oresaid.

"The right to enforce such personal liability shall not enure to any person other than the
person with whom such an agreement is made, nor shall such personal liability continue after
the said grantee has bona fide parted with the encumbered property, unless he shall have expressly assumed such continuing liability."

assumed a mortgage could be sued by the mortgagee, as legal plaintiff, even when

2. Merriman v. Moore, 9o Pa. 78 (1879).
Although this case was decided after the act
had been passed, the transaction involved occurred prior thereto, and the act was not given
retrospective effect.
3. Lennox v. Brower, 16o Pa. 191, 28 Atl. 839 (1894).
4. Fisler v. Reach, 202 Pa. 74, 51 Atl. 599 (19o2). Since the obligation of the grantee
to the mortgagor-grantor in such a case would only be to indemnify against loss, the latter
would apparently have no right of action to assign unless he had paid, in which case the
mortgagee would have no reason for suing the grantee.
5. Lennox v. Brower, i6o Pa. 191, 28 Atl. 839 (1894) ; May's Estate, 218 Pa. 64, 67 Atl.
12o (19o7) ; Faulkner v. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298, 83 Atl. 827 (1912).
6. Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. 328, 33 Atl. 344 (895) ; Wunderlich v. Sadler, i89
Pa. 469, 42 Atl. io9 (i899) ; Lowry v. Hensal's Heirs, 281 Pa. 572, 127 Atl. 219 (924).

7. Sloan v. Klein, 230 Pa. 132, 79 Atl. 403 (igio).

Although this decision adhered to

the plain mandate of the statute, it may be hard to support consistently with reasoning in the
instant cases, which apparently accorded to the mortgagee the status of a creditor beneficiary,
which status should continue unaffected by a second conveyance. The statute may be construed, however, as limiting the promise.
8. Tritten's Estate, 238 Pa. 555, 86 Atl. 461 (1913). This case cited and relied upon
Fisler v. Reach, 202 Pa. 74, 5I Atl. 599 (19o2), where there was no express assumption by
the grantee. Cf. Commonwealth v. DuPont Land Co., 254 Pa. 446, 98 At,. 1047 (1916).
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of opinion has felt that these latter cases represented the law in this state,9 but
such a view has been definitely repudiated in the instant cases which, in effect,
follow the modern and desirable tendency in most other states, which allow suits
by third party beneficiaries.' 0
Taxation-State Tax on Use of Cigarettes Purchased in Interstate
Commerce-Plaintiff shipped cigarettes in their original packages from
Oklahoma to purchasers in Texas. A Texas statute imposed a tax on "the first
sale or distribution of cigarettes in intrastate commerce or the first use or consumption of cigarettes within this state." ' Plaintiff sought an injunction against
the collection of the tax. Held (one justice dissenting), that defendant state
comptroller should be restrained from collecting the tax from plaintiff, and from
interfering with the right of purchasers from plaintiff to use the cigarettes without paying the tax, on the ground that it unduly burdened interstate commerce 2
Sheppardv. Mimser, 89 S. W. (2d) 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
The statute in the instant case, by employing the words "first use . . .
within the state", sought to conceal the fact that, when applied to the plaintiff,
the tax was laid on interstate commerce, being levied upon articles coming from
outside the state in their original package before they had reached their destination within the state.- It is clar that until the cigarettes in their original packages reached the purchasers no tax could be imposed by the state either directly
on them as property, or on their sale or use, or as an occupation tax for the privilege of selling them. 4 The court perceived that the real effect of the tax was
to burden unduly interstate commerce, but it seems to have gone too far in its
decree. The protection given purchasers from the plaintiff in their use of cigarettes on which taxes were not paid 5 was unwarranted, because the original
package doctrine was not applicable to such a case,6 and the scope of the injunction is all the more surprising in view of the fact that the purchasers' rights were
not before the court, nor had any complaint been made of their violation. 7 The
9. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, PA. ANNOT. (1933) § 136; Note (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 791. But see Ledwith, The Personal Liability of the Grantee of Mortgaged Property
(1933) 17 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. n17.
io. People's Say. Bank v. Jordan, 2oo Ala. 50o, 76 So. 442 (1917) ; Becker v. Nelson,
164 Minn. 367, 2o5 N. W. 262 (1925) ; Parlier v. Miller, 186 N. C. 5Ol, 119 S. E. 898 (1923).
Other jurisdictions allow recovery on the theory of equitable subrogation. Johns v. Wilson,
i8o U. S. 44o (igoi) ; Thacker v. Hubard & Appleby, 122 Va. 379, 94 S. E. 929 (1918).
i. TEx. Civ. STAT. Supp. (Vernon, 1935) art. 7047c-I, § i (h).
2. The Texas Supreme Court in Ex parte Kimberlin, 86 S. W. (2d) 717, 720 (Tex.
1935) said, in construing the same statute, that the sale or consumption after delivery to the
purchaser would be taxable. The instant court, at 226, rejected this as dictuo, and also for
the reason that the supreme court case had not yet been published in the state reports.
3. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827) held that a state could not tax imports while they remained in their original package. An analogous doctrine was applied to
articles introduced into the state from other states, the doctrine being limited to cases where
the tax unduly burdened interstate commerce. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161 (189o) ;
American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 5oo (1904) ; see Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 5o6, 510 (1923). For proposed legislation to permit state taxation of interstate commerce, analogous to the legislation depriving liquor in interstate commerce of its
immunity from state regulation, see Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in. Interstate
Commerce (1933) 12 N. CAR. L. REv. 99, io8.
4. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 (1878) (license tax on auctioneer selling goods in
original package) ; In re Minor, 69 Fed. 233 (1895) ; State v. Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, 27 S. E.
225 (1897) (license tax on dealers in cigarettes in original package).
5. Instant case at 226.
6. May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496 (igoo) (tax valid on cigarettes purchased in interstate commerce but exposed for sale, original package having been broken) ; see American
Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 519-522 (1904).
7. Instant case at 228.
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court reasoned that "the consumption of the cigarettes, purchased through interstate commerce, is a necessary incident to the ownership thereof, and the purchaser, having so acquired lawful title, cannot be thus taxed . . . without . . .

destroying his right of lawful ownership". 8 However, the United States
Supreme Court, in upholding a state tax on gasoline stored within the state is a
case where the taxpayer bad purchased the gasoline elsewhere and, after bringing
it into the state, had removed it from the original tank cars, said that whete
property was taxable, the constituent elements of property-the several incidents
of ownership-were taxable.9 It cannot, in the light of that decision, be disputed that the cigarettes became taxable after they had reached the purchaser,
being no longer in interstate commerce whether or not they remained in their
original package, 10 and thereafter their consumption, being an incident of ownership, also was taxable.
Torts-False Imprisonment-Probable Cause for Suspicion as a Defense-Defendant's detective thought she saw plaintiff stealing certain articles from a counter in defendant's store, and detained him for about twenty
minutes for investigation, after which he was turned over to the police. An
action for false imprisonment was brought for the twenty minutes' detention
prior to the arrest. Held, for defendant, on the ground that an owner of property may, for the purpose of protecting it, restrain for a reasonable time and
for the purpose of investigation, one whom he has reasonable and probable cause
to suspect of stealing it. Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 54 P. (2d) 20 (Cal. 1936).
Plaintiff entered defendant's self-service grocery store and took from the
shelves some groceries, which he put in a bag, and some candy, which he put
in his pocket. On leaving, he exhibited the groceries at the checking counter
and paid for them. Defendant's employees, who had seen the plaintiff take the
candy, followed him to the street, forced him to return to the store, and there
searched him, finding nothing. The candy was later found on a counter. After
ten minutes' detention, plaintiff was permitted to leave. In an action for false
imprisonment, held, for defendant, on the authority of the Collyer case, sitpra.
Bettolo z. Safeway Stores, I1c., 54 P. (2d) 24 (Cal. App. 1936).
While it is frequently stated that probable cause is no defense in false
imprisonment cases in which plaintiff is believed to have committed a misdemeanor, 1 such statements have usually occurred, as the court in the Collyer case
pointed out, in decisions in cases which involved arrests for misdemeanors, made
under illegal process or by private individuals where no offense had been committed, rather than in cases involving detentions, the primary purpose of which was
the protection of the defendant's own property. But although there is no liability
able.

8. Id. at 226. The court conceded that a resale by the purchasers would have been tax-

9. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 268 (1933) ;
accord, Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249 (933) (tax on gasoline used
within the state held valid where the only intrastate use made of it was to draw it from its
original tank cars in preparation for fueling airplanes engaged in interstate commerce).
io. The cigarettes were, of course, not consumed in their original package, but similar
taxes have been upheld even where the articles remained in their original package, because they
had become a part of the mass o~f property within the state, as by being sold therein [Waring
v. Mayor of Mobile, 8 Wall. i1O, 122 (U. S. 1869)], or by "coming to rest". Brown v.
Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885) ; see American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 5oo, 519522 (19o4) ; Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466, 475-476 (1922) ; Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U. S. 517, 539 (1933).
i. Daniels v. Milstead, 221 Ala. 353, 128 So. 447 (193o) ; Nelson v. Kellogg, 162 Cal.
621, 123 Pac. 1115 (1912) ; Palmer v. Maine Central R. R., 92 Me. 399, 42 Ati. 8oo (1899);
Harris v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 203 Mo. App. 324, 218 S. W. 686 (192o).
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for merely requesting a customer who was leaving the store, to remain in order to
find whether he has paid his bill,2 no other cases have been found in which actual
restraint has been held to have been justified.3 However, there have been cases
in which it has been held that probable cause is a defense in an action for punitive,
but not for merely compensatory damages.4 And in Jacques v. Childs Dining
Hall Co.,' it was said that a reasonable detention for a reasonable time to investigate the circumstances would be justified, 6 but as the jury there found the detention unreasonable, liability was imposed. In determining whether or not a
detention is reasonable under the circumstances the situation as it appears to the
defendant must necessarily be taken into account. In allowing a shopkeper a
reasonable degree of latitude to investigate cases of apparent shop-lifting the
courts seem to have adopted a desirable view.
Trusts-Tracing Trust Funds-Right of Principal to Construct Trust
Upon Proceeds of Insurance Policy on Life of Agent Who Used Principal's
Money to Pay Premiums- Plaintiff gave insured $4750.00 with which to discharge a mortgage upon plaintiff's property. Insured deposited this money in
his personal bank account and then exhausted the entire account for his own purposes, applying $808.05 to the payment of premiums upon an already-existing
life insurance policy for $85,000.00 with the defendant, his wife, as beneficiary.
Shortly thereafter, insured committed suicide. Plaintiff now seeks to construct
a trust upon the proceeds of the policy in the hands of defendant to the extent of
$4750.00 plus interest. Held, that despite a statute entitling beneficiaries of
insurance policies to the proceeds as against creditors of the insured,1 plaintiff
should receive that proportion of the proceeds which the premiums paid with his
money bore to the total premiums paid, the total not to exceed $475o.oo, plus
interest. Coffin v'. Shour, 285 N. Y. S. 197 (App. Div. ist Dep't, 1936).
Where the insured pays part or all of the premiums of a life insurance policy,
payable to a third person, with money obtained through embezzlement, fraud or
theft, the right of the defrauded person to trace into the proceeds of such policy
has been variously defined. While statutes such as that in the instant case are
common, and are strictly applied as against mere creditors of the insured, they
generally have not been enforced against defrauded persons.2 Nearly all the cases
concede that he is entitled to trace, 3 provided that he can prove his funds were
used to pay the premiums, 4 but they differ as to the amount he may recover and
Fenn v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 209 S. W. 885 (Mo. 1919).
3. This type of situation does not appear to be included among those in which the Restatement of Torts states that there is a privilege to intentionally invade interests of personality. See REsTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 77-87.
4. Hostettler v. Carter, 73 Okla. 125, 175 Pac. 244 (ii8) (proprietor of shoe store
suspected plaintiff of taking shoes). This was apparently the theory of the trial courts in
the instant cases.
5. 244 Mass. 438, 138 N. E. 843 (1923).
6. Id. at 439, 138 N. E. at 844.
2.

i. N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 30, § 55-a.

2. Since the defrauded person is attempting to recover his own money, or the product
thereof, he is said not to be a creditor in the sense of such statutes. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 194 N. W. 548 (1923) ; Truelsch v. Miller, 186 Wis. 239,
202 N. W. 352 (1925). Contra: Bennett v. Rosborough, 155 Ga. 265, 116 S. E. 788 (1923).
3. In American Nat. Bank v. King, 158 Okla. 278, 13 P. (2d) 164 (1932), the court
stressed the value created by the suicide of the insured as one ground for refusing to allow
the defrauded person to reach the proceeds of the policy. Apparently this is the only case in
which this argument has been advanced, and it was disapproved in (1933) 31 MicH. L. REV.
869.
4. The burden is on the defrauded person to show clearly that his funds were applied in
payment of the premiums. Bromley v. Cleveland Ry., 103 Wis. 562, 79 N. W. I4I (1899).
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the nature of his interest in the proceeds. In a few instances, the injured party
has been limited to a lien for the amount of the premiums paid with his money,
plus interest.5 In the majority, however, the court has impressed a trust upon the
proceeds in proportion to the amount of the premiums paid with his money.
Where all the premiums were paid with embezzled funds, the only two cases
found constructed a trust upon all the proceeds,6 but where the premiums were
paid partly with embezzled funds and partly with funds of the insured or a third
person, the cases are by no means clear.7 In two, the courts awarded the defrauded party a proportionate part of the proceeds limited by the total amount of
the funds misappropriated by the insured.8 In three cases, the courts constructed
a trust apparently proportionately upon the proceeds regardless of whether that
amount exceeded the total sum embezzled, but failed to give sufficient facts to
demonstrate this clearly.9 Under the modern theory of tracing, it would seem
that the defrauded person should be entitled, at his option, to an equitable lien
upon the proceeds of the policy for the amount of his funds wrongfully used in
payment of the premiums, or a constructive trust upon the proceeds in the proportion that the premiums paid with misappropriated funds bears to the total
premiums, even though this exceeds the total sum misappropriated.' 0 If the
court in the instant case intended to go so far as to hold that the plaintiff, in no
event, could recover more than the total fund misappropriated, it had some
authority upon which to base its conclusion, but such a conclusion would be contrary to the modern doctrine and apparently contrary, at least, to the theory of
previous New York cases. 1 But it may be that New York is in accord with the
modern view, and that the court limited plaintiff's recovery only because the
plaintiff himself failed to request the full remedy to which he would have been
entitled."
5. Hubbard v. Stapp, 32 Ill. App. 541 (1899) ; Thum v. Wolstenholme, 21 Utah 446, 61

Pac. 537 (19oo) ; see Tolman v. Crowell, 288 Mass. 397, 401, 193 N. E. 6o, 62 (934).
6. Shaler v. Trowbridge, 28 N. J. Eq. 595 (1877); Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369, 34
N. E. 205 (1893). However, in both of these cases the funds embezzled exceeded the proceeds of the policies, and the result may have been different if this had not been the fact, but
this is not clear.
7. See VANCE, IN SURANCE (2d ed. 193o) § 162 (2).
8. Exchange State Bank v. Poindexter, 137 Kan. ioi, 19 P. (2d) 705 (I933), (934)
I8
MINN. L. REv. 366; Truelsch v. Miller, 186 Wis. 239, 202 N. W. 352 (925), 35 YALE L. J.
220.

g. Vorlander v. Keyes, I F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924), (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rmv. 490;
Dayton v. Claflin Co., 19 App. Div. 120, 45 N. Y. S. lOO5 (Ist Dep't x897) ; Mass. Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 194 N. W. 548 (1923). The total amount embezzled
does not appear in the first two cases; it does appear in the third, but it cannot be ascertained from the opinion whether plaintiff recovered more than this amount or not.
10. This rule is approved in RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(Proposed Final Draft, 1936) § 210 (2), and illustr. 5. See also, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(r935) § 2w, com. h, illustr. 16. The reason for allowing the defrauded person a proportionate interest in the increased product of the wrongfully mingled fund, whether or not such
interest exceeds the total sum embezzled or that portion of it going into the fund, is that his
money helped produce the increase, and to the extent to which it did so, he should be able to
share therein. Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled With Other Money
(1913) 27 HAav. L. REv. 125; Ames, Following Misappropriated Property Into Its Product
(19o6) ig HARv. L. Rzv. 511; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 193o) 61g, n. 29.
Ix. Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 205 (1893) (premiums paid entirely with
embezzled funds) ; Dayton v. Claflin Co., 19 App. Div. 120, 45 N. Y. S. ioo5 (Ist Dep't,
1897) (premiums paid partly with embezzled funds and partly with funds supplied by the
beneficiary).
12. This would seem to be the correct interpretation since New York has adopted the
modem theory in other situations, allowing the cestui que triest to recover the profit realized
by the trustee ex inaleficio. Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N. Y. 190, 135 N. E. 243 (1922) ; Fur &
Wool Trading Co.. Ltd. v. Fox, Inc., 245 N. Y. 215, 156 N. E. 670 (1927).

